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Abstract
We show that a durable goods monopolist that introduces its products sequentially will
choose higher-than-optimum qualities. This result diﬀers from traditional screening models, in
which the qualities of a non-durable goods monopolist’s products never exceed the optimum.
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1 Introduction
New technology is usually expensive and it takes time for manufacturers to make the technology
more accessible. In the stereo industry, the ﬁrst Super Audio Compact Disk (SACD) player
made by Sony,3 SCD-1, sold for $5,000 in 1999; in 2002 the cheapest of Sony’s new SACD
players, SCD-CE775, had a $250 MSRP, while the SCD-1 continued to be Sony’s ﬂagship
model. The electrostatic speaker manufacturer MartinLogan developed a technology trade-
marked ClearSpars for their Statement e2 speakers, which came to the market in 2000 with
a list price of $80,000 per pair. MartinLogan later applied the technology to their mid-price
($3300 per pair) Aeon i in 2003. The ampliﬁer manufacturer Conrad-Johnson introduced in
2000 its current top pre-ampliﬁer, ART Series 2, and in 2003 added to their product line a
stripped-down version of the ART, the Premier 17LS, whose price is less than one-third the
price of the ART. The four-wheel-drive vehicle manufacturer Land Rover introduced their mid-
price model Discovery in 1986, after they remodeled their luxury line Range Rover in the early
80s.
In these examples, before the ﬁrms could scale down their new technologies for the mass
markets, they sold only the high-end products; and after the more aﬀordable low-end products
became available, they sold both kinds of products. Furthermore, these products are durable
goods, and so by the time the ﬁrms introduced the low-end products, the consumers who had
bought the high-end products were no longer in the market.
In this paper we abstract from the inter-ﬁrm competition. That is, we assume that the
durable goods market is monopoly, and study the quality decision and the pricing of the durable
goods monopolist whose ﬁrst-generation product has higher quality than the second-generation
one, which is not available at the time the ﬁrst-generation product is ﬁrst introduced to the
market.4 In addition to Coasian dynamics, or intertemporal price discrimination, the issue
3Sony Electronics, Inc. and Philips Electronics, Inc. jointly developed the SACD format to replace the
compact discs.
4Sometimes a ﬁrm is able to produce both high-end and low-end products from the beginning but decides not
to. Publishers do not print paperbacks of new books until they have sold the hardcovers for some time. Some
2involves intertemporal quality discrimination. Our analysis focuses on whether the monopolist
would produce goods with qualities higher than the optimum.
In a static single-quality model without price discrimination, Spence (1975) compares the
quality of non-durable good produced by a monopolist with the optimum, and ﬁnds that the
monopoly’s quality could be higher or lower than the optimum, depending on the demand
conditions. In particular, for a linear demand, the quality chosen by the monopolist is the
same as the optimum. In a dynamic single-quality model with price discrimination, Chi (1999)
discusses the quality choice of a durable goods monopolist, and shows that with linear demand,
the intertemporal price discrimination makes a monopolist choose a quality at least as high as
the optimum, and higher than the optimum when the discount factor is small.
In static quality (or quantity) discrimination models, where a monopolist can use several
quality-price packages to screen consumers, it is well known that a monopolist would discrim-
inate the consumers by oﬀering the eﬃcient quality only to the consumer with the highest
valuation, and oﬀering everyone else a quality less than the optimum. In no circumstances
could the consumers get above-optimum quality in the static model.5 However, in our model
of intertemporal quality discrimination, we ﬁnd that the monopolist will produce goods of
above-optimum qualities in its product line.
That the monopolist might oﬀer above-optimum quality is new to the literature of qual-
ity discrimination. Moorthy and Png (1992) consider a monopolist who faces two types of
consumers (high-demand and low-demand) and is able to introduce high and low qualities si-
multaneously. In some cases, the monopolist prefers sequential introduction: high-end product
in the ﬁrst period and low-end in the second. However, the qualities do not exceed the optimum
in any equilibrium. Wang (2000) also uses a model with two types of consumers, and shows that
when the monopolist is able to oﬀer two quality-price packages each period, the result is the
same as static quality discrimination. Therefore, no qualities can be higher than the optimum.
Wilson and Norton (1989) focus on the timing for introducing the lower-quality product, and
do not discuss how the ﬁrm chooses prices or qualities.
fashion designers oﬀer mid-price lines of their clothes after they have established their brand names. Wilson
and Norton (1989) and Moorthy and Png (1992) study when a monopolist should introduce the lower-quality
version, given that its production is always feasible.
5See Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984).
3In the papers discussing product upgrades or product obsolescence, Bulow (1986) shows that
the monopolist will reduce the durability of its product, and hence the quality is lower than the
optimum. A ﬁrm can also make its current product obsoleted by introducing a better product.
Levinthal and Purohit (1989) study the case. They focus on the timing of introducing the new
product, the pricing, and the use of buyback policy, but assume that the quality diﬀerence
between the two generations’ products is an exogenous variable. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998)
use a very general framework to study product upgrades and the related marketing practices –
tradeins and buybacks, but they too treat the qualities as exogenous variables.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. We adopt Bulow’s
(1982) two-period framework. The monopolist and the consumers live for two periods and
have the same discount factor. As in Mussa and Rosen’s (1978) vertical-diﬀerentiation model,
consumers’ preference for quality are indexed by a parameter with a continuous distribution,
which is simpliﬁed here to be uniform.
Section 3 establishes the eﬃcient qualities of the product line chosen by a benevolent social
planner, and shows that if the monopolist is able to commit to its second-period behavior, there
is no distortion in qualities.
Section 4 solves the equilibrium when the monopolist cannot commit. We show that both
the ﬁrst-period and the second-period products have higher quality than the optimum.
2 The Model
There are two periods, t =1 ,2. At the start of period 1, the monopolist is endowed with a
technology to produce a single perfectly durable good, denoted by H, and to produce in period
2 a second-generation product with lower quality, denoted by L. We assume that the technology
takes time to become “mature,” and therefore it is not feasible for the monopolist to produce
the lower quality product L in period 1. The monopolist makes the following choices. In period
1, it decides the quality of H, qh, and then sets a price p1. I np e r i o d2 ,a f t e ro b s e r v i n gt h e
quantity sold in period 1, it decides whether to introduce L. If it does, it then decides the
quality of L, ql,a n di t sp r i c er. Whether or not it introduces L, it needs to decide the price of
4H sold in this period, p2. To simplify the model, assume that the unit costs of the two products
are c(qi)=bq2
i /2, i = h,l,w h e r eb>0 is a parameter.
There is a continuum of consumers, whose marginal utility of income is constant and valu-
ations of the products are indexed by θ; the distribution of θ is uniform on [0,1]. Consuming
a product with quality q,at y p e - θ consumer gets per-period utility
θq + I,
where I is his net income. Each consumer has unit demand for the monopolist’s product. In
equilibrium, a consumer who purchases in period 1 will not purchase in period 2, since the
second-period product’s quality is lower. The consumers have perfect information about the
products’ qualities when the products are on the market, and have perfect foresight in the ﬁrst
period about the monopolist’s second-period strategy since the strategy has to be subgame
perfect. The consumers and the monopolist have a common discount factor δ.
At y p e - θ consumer could purchase H in period 1, H in period 2, L in period 2, or nothing
at all, depending on which decision gives him the highest net utility. Namely, he looks for the
maximum of the following values:
{(1 + δ)θq 1 − p1,δ(θq 1 − p2),δ(θq l − r),0} .
3 The Optimum and the Commitment Solution
We ﬁrst consider the qualities chosen by a welfare-maximizing social planner. Then we assume
that the monopolist can make commitment in period 1 to its period-2 actions: ql, p2,a n dr.
Last we compare the commitment solution with the optimum.
3.1 The Optimum
Like the monopolist, the social planner can produce only one product in the ﬁrst period. To
maximize social welfare, the prices of H is set to be the marginal cost bq2
h/2i nb o t hp e r i o d s ,




h/2, r∗ = bq2
l /2, where the asterisk stands for
optimum. Since the price of H equals marginal cost, all consumers who can get non-negative
net utility from purchasing H in period 2 will purchase it in period 1. Hence, there is no market
for H in period 2.
Let θh be the type of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing H in period 1 and
purchasing L in period 2:








) ≥ 0 . (1)
Then consumers whose types are above θh purchase H in period 1, and the demand for H is
1 − θh.







All type-θ consumers, θ>θ l, get positive net utility from purchasing L, and therefore the
demand for L is θh − θl.


















where θh and θl are deﬁned in (1) and (2). The solution is:
qh =
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9+1 0 δ +9 δ2
b(27 + 22δ +2 7 δ2)
. (9)
Note that the above four variables are all increasing in δ.
3.2 The Commitment Solution
Assume that the monopolist can commit itself in period 1 to its period-2 actions: ql, p2,a n dr.
There are four period-2 strategies to which the monopolist can make its commitment: selling L
only, selling H only, selling both, and selling none. However, it is well known in the literature
of the Coase conjecture, e.g., Bulow (1982), that the monopolist does worse from selling in
period 2 only H than selling nothing. Furthermore, committing itself to selling both H and L
is equivalent to the case in which the monopolist cannot commit. So we only need to consider
the cases that the monopolist commits to selling in period 2 only L and selling nothing. And
since the monopolist, when adopting the strategy of selling only L, can mimic the strategy
of selling nothing by setting the price r high enough, selling only L weakly dominates selling
nothing.6 Therefore, if the monopolist can commit, it will sell in period 1 only H a n di np e r i o d
2o n l yL.
To commit itself to selling only L in period 2, the monopolist will set p2 such that no
consumers will buy H in period 2. Given p1, ql,a n dr, the marginal consumer who purchases
H in period 1 is type θc




hqh − p1 = δ(θ
c
hql − r) . (10)
6Indeed, it can be shown that the proﬁt from selling H in period 1 and L in period 2 is larger than the proﬁt
from selling H in period 1 and nothing in period 2, when δ>0; and that the proﬁts are equal if δ =0 .
7And the marginal consumer who purchases L in period 2 is type θc




lql − r =0. (11)
The demands for H and L are then 1−θc
h and θc
h−θc
l, respectively. From (10) and (11), we get
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And the proﬁt is
ˆ Π
c =
−(27 + 22δ +2 7 δ2)(ˆ θc
1)3 +3 ( 9+2 δ +9 δ2)(ˆ θc













i,i = h,l . (20)
8Proposition 1. If the monopolist can commit itself in period 1 to selling only L in period
2, to the quality of L, and to the price of L, then the qualities of H and L are both optimal,
but the quantities sold are both less than the optimum.
4 The No-commitment Solution
Suppose now that the monopolist cannot commit itself to its period-2 behavior. Then its
choices of ql, p2,a n dr have to be subgame perfect, and therefore after observing qh and p1,t h e
consumers have perfect foresight in period 1 about the ﬁrm’s choices in period 2.
We solve the game by backward induction. Given qh and p1,t h e r ei saθ1
h such that all
type-θ  consumers, θ  ≥ θ1
h , purchase H in period 1. At the start of period 2, the types
of consumers who are in the market are in the region [0,θ 1
h], which can be divided into two
sections: TL =[ θl,θ 2
h]a n dTH =[ θ2
h,θ 1
h], where the cutoﬀ values are deﬁned as follows:
θlql − r =0, (21)
θ
2
hqh − p2 = θ
2
hql − r, (22)
(1 + δ)θ
1
hqh − p1 = δ(θ
1
hqh − p2) . (23)
In period 2, those consumers whose types are in TL purchase L,a n dt h o s ei nTH purchase H.
Note that p2 must be at least equal to bq2
h/2, the marginal cost of H, and hence if θ1
h ≤ bqh/2,
then for all θ ≤ θ1
h, θqh ≤ bq2
h/2, and the monopolist will not sell H in period 2.
If θ1



























h ≥ θl, (26)
(21),and (22).
Using (21) and (22), and ignoring the constraints (25) and (26), the ﬁrst order conditions for
θ2
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a function of qh and θ1
h.
From (30), θ2
h >θ l as long as θ2
h exists; and θ1
h ≥ θ2
h if θ1
h ≥ 3bqh/4. If bqh/2 <θ 1
h < 3bqh/4,
then the constraint that θ1
h ≥ θ2
h is binding, and the monopolist does not sell H in period 2.
Therefore, depending on the values of qh and θ1
h, there are two cases to consider:
(1) The monopolist sells both H and L in period 2: θl <θ 2
h ≤ θ1
h, which holds if θ1
h ≥ 3bqh/4.
(2) The monopolist sells only L in period 2: θ1
h < 3bqh/4.
104.1 The monopolist sells both products in period 2
Suppose that θ1
h ≥ 3bqh/4, then θl <θ 2
h ≤ θ1
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subject to the constraint that θ1
h ≥ θ2







Let µ be the Lagrange multiplier, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
θ
1
h : qh[(−4 − δ)θ
1
h +( 1− δ)bqh +2+δ]+2 µ =0, (34)
qh :( −4 − δ)(θ
1
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2 +( 4+2 δ)θ
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h +( 4− 4δ)θ
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3 − 4(1 − δ)
√
A










3b(16 − 12δ +2 1 δ
2)
, (37)
where A =6 4− 48δ − 28δ2 − 216δ3 − 47δ4, which is positive if δ<0.51.
The constraint (33) is not binding if δ<2/7. When δ ≥ 2/7, the constraint is binding. But
11then the monopolist cannot sell a positive amount of H in period 2, for θ1
h − θ2
h =0 ;a n dt h e
case is the same as the one that the monopolist sells only L in period 2. When δ<2/7, denote




27b(4 + δ)(16 − 12δ +2 1 δ2)2 (38)
where B = 512 + 1152δ + 1824δ2 + 5472δ3 + 1680δ4 + 1296δ5 + 314δ6.
Lemma 1. The monopolist sells both H and L in period 2 only if δ<2/7.
4.2 The monopolist sells only L in period 2
Suppose that θ1
h ≤ 3bqh/4, then the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy in period 2 is to sell only L.S i n c e
the price for L is r = θlql, the ﬁrm solves in period 2
max
θl,ql
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Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier, then the ﬁrst order conditions are:
qh :[ ( 1 + δ)θ
1
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b(27 + 38δ +2 7 δ2)
, (43)
If δ>1/3, then θ1
h < 3bqh/4 as required. If δ ≤ 1/3, the constraint is binding, and we have
λ>0a n dθ1











Denote by ΠL1 and ΠL2 the monopolist’s total proﬁt from selling only L in period 2 when




27b(3 + 7δ)2 (46)
Π
L2 =
2(9 + 14δ +9 δ2)3
27b(27 + 38δ +2 7 δ2)2. (47)
134.3 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
From lemma 1, we know that if δ ≥ 2/7, the monopolist will not sell both H and L in period
2. Using the results in section 4.2, we have the next lemma.
Lemma 2. If δ ≥ 2/7, the monopolist sells only L in period 2, and the qualities of H and
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h =
(1 + δ)(18 + 28δ +1 8 δ2)








If δ<2/7, we need to compare the monopolist’s total proﬁt from selling both products in
period 2, Πboth, with that from selling only L,Π L1.S i n c eΠ both > ΠL1 for all δ<2/7, we have
the next result.
Proposition 2. If the monopolist cannot commit, then (a) when δ<2/7, it sells both H
and L in period 2, and sets the quality of H as qboth
h of (37), and the quality of L as qboth
h /2; (b)
when δ ≥ 2/7, it sells only L in period 2, and the qualities of H and L are as given in lemma 2.
We can now compare the monopolist’s quality choice with the optimal q∗
h and q∗
l , given in
(8) and (9), respectively. We ﬁnd that the monopolist airways selects higher-than-optimum
qualities.
Proposition 3. When the monopolist cannot commit and δ>0, the monopolist always
selects a higher-than-optimum quality of H and L.
Figure 1 plots the q∗
H and the monopolist’s choices of qH.
The “over-screening” result is due to the monopolist’s lack of commitment power. As we
have shown, when the monopolist can commit, it will not distort the qualities of its products.
But when it cannot commit, it needs to deviate its quality choices from the optimum. In static
quality discrimination models, the monopolist keeps the quality for high-valuation consumers
at the optimum and lowers the quality for low-valuation consumers. This strategy is not proﬁt






















Figure 1: The qualities of H, b =1
our case, the quality of L is linked with the quality of H i nt h es u b g a m eo fp e r i o d2 ,a n d
therefore the monopolist cannot distort qL only.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that when it takes time for a durable goods monopolist to extend its product
line to the lower end, the qualities of both its high-end and low-end products will be higher
than the optimum. This intertemporal quality discrimination problem diﬀers from the static
quality discrimination problems in that there is no commitment problem in static models. To
counter the Coase problem, the monopolist raises the quality of its high-end product to exceed
the optimum so that the consumers does not want to postpone their purchases.
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